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What makes a statute effective enforcement statistics such as convictions and
fines or whether it is, in practice and in the field, observed by those whose
conduct it targets? The authors take the position that the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), by any measure, has been effective in curbing improper
conduct by U.S. companies. In contrast, many of the criticisms and proposals
for "reform" show a lack of understanding of the actual practices by the
enforcement authorities and the companies regulated by the statute, or are
motivated by misplaced policy considerations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was first enacted in 1977 amidst
a furor over foreign payments and off-the-books cash slush funds maintained by
U.S. issuers. I In signing the legislation, President Jimmy Carter noted, "Corrupt
practices between corporations and public officials overseas undermine the
integrity and stability of governments and harm our relations with other
countries. Recent revelations of widespread overseas bribery have eroded public
confidence in our business institutions. " 2 Although the legislation provided for
"hard" enforcement through criminal prosecution and civil injunctions, it also
incorporated "soft" enforcement aspects, including "safe harbors" associated
1Philip B. Heyman [sic], Justice Outlines Priorities in Prosecuting Violations of
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 1979, at 4.21d. at 5.
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with FCPA Opinions issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
requirements that issuers implement reasonable internal financial controls. 3
Indeed, from the very beginning, the government's intent was to take into
consideration a corporation's genuine efforts to comply with the law. For
example, in 1979, Philip B. Heymann, the Assistant Attorney General for DOJ's
Criminal Division announced that although "[p]ro forma adoption of an
antibribery policy will not insulate top management and the company from
intense investigation and prosecution if serious controls are lacking[,] ... where
a company has been making good faith efforts to monitor its employees, that
will be relevant in our decision how to proceed."14 Heymann concluded by
saying, "The most efficient means of implementing the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act is voluntary compliance by the American business community." 5
Experience under the FCPA for the past thirty-five years has mirrored these
themes. The government has actively investigated and prosecuted FCPA cases,
and some very big names have been caught in the enforcement web. The
number of prosecutions, however, although increasing in recent years, is not
really the right measure of the FCPA's effectiveness in preventing transnational
bribery by U.S. companies. Of more significance, the risk of government
enforcement has spurred a public/private regime of "soft" enforcement, in
which industry groups, individual corporations, and the government have
engaged in a dialogue-admittedly sometimes in the context of enforcement
actions-over what internal controls and procedures are effective in preventing
corruption. The corporate community's overall commitment to this internal
compliance regime is the best measure of the FCPA's effectiveness.
Moreover, after thirty-five years of experience of doing business under the
FCPA, the business community has largely internalized the necessary controls.
Despite criticism aimed at the FCPA from certain business organizations and
academics, the general scope of the FCPA is fairly well-delineated and
understood. Many of the criticisms fail to identify an FCPA-centric problem
other than that the authorities are enforcing the law. In many cases, the
medicine they recommend to cure the alleged ill of ambiguity and overreaching
prosecution is more likely to kill the patient, that is, enforcement of the FCPA,
than to improve its health through allegedly bringing greater clarity as to its
elements and defenses. This is not to say there aren't problems in application of
the existing statute, but they aren't necessarily the problems identified by the
critics, nor are they likely to be solved by the solutions the critics propose.
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II. CORPORATE BEHAVIOR AND ENFORCEMENT RISK PRIOR TO THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FCPA
Prior to the enactment of the FCPA, no country in the world explicitly
prohibited bribery of foreign officials for business purposes. 6 This is not to say
that no U.S. law could be interpreted to apply to such conduct. Under the
honest-services fraud theory, the government could proceed under the federal
mail- and wire-fraud statutes7 to prosecute payments that deprived an employer,
including a foreign government, of the honest services of its employee, the
foreign official. 8 Further, many states prohibit commercial bribery, and federal
prosecutors could charge violations of those state bribery laws using the Travel
Act.9 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) maintained that U.S.
corporations were required to disclose such payments as part of the securities
laws. That is, "[w]hen the SEC successfully prosecuted a company for an illicit
payment, it was because the agency could prove that the company failed to
disclose a 'material' transaction in violation of U.S. securities law[s]."'10 "In
addition, prosecutors could invoke the Bank Secrecy Act, which requires the
reporting of funds that are taken out of, or brought into, the United States." 11
"However, such indirect means of preventing foreign bribery were
ineffective."' 12 This incomplete method of prosecuting foreign bribery prevented
6 Frontline WORLD, Reactions to Spotlight: History of the FCPA, PBS (Feb. 13,
2009), http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/02/history-of-the-fcpa.html.
7 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006).
8 The honest-services theory has a long and storied history. For many years, it was the
main vehicle by which the federal government prosecuted corrupt state officials. In 1987, in
A/fcNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 361 (1987), the Supreme Court struck down a
conviction under this theory, finding no support in the text of the mail or wire fraud statutes.
Congress quickly responded in 1988 by inserting a statutory definition, codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (2006), that stated that a "scheme or artifice to defraud" included corrupt schemes "to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." Skilling v. United States, 130
S. Ct. 2896, 2927 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C § 1346 (2006)). Although the theory is again
under attack today with the Supreme Court finding that § 1346 is overly vague in
application, the core concept that an employer may suffer tangible harm when a third party
suborns one of its employees or agents-has thus far not been questioned. See id. at 2935
(Scalia, J., concurring).
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006).
10 Sam Singer, Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Private Equity
Era: Extracting a Hidden Element, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 273, 274 (2009).
1 Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private
Right of Action, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 185, 188 (1994); see also The Financial Recordkeeping
and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 5330
(2006); Notice of Plea and Plea Agreement, United States v. Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV-
01505 (D.D.C. July 10, 1979).
12 Pines, supra note 11, at 188.
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prosecutions, and perhaps more importantly, failed to send the desired message
that the bribery of foreign officials was wrong. 13
In 1974, Stanley Sporkin, the head of the SEC's Enforcement Division,
established a "'voluntary disclosure program' that allowed an issuer to conduct
an internal investigation of its foreign payments, adopt a policy of ceasing such
payments, and file a report concerning these matters with the SEC."' 14 Sporkin
warned companies that "unless companies voluntarily made immediate and full
disclosure of their activities, they would face harsher legal consequences
later."15 This amnesty-like approach swiftly brought many bribes in the public
view, as over 600 corporations voluntarily disclosed the making of illicit
foreign payments to obtain contracts. 16 "After the extent of the bribery was
discovered, the SEC's first priority was to remedy the deficiencies in the legal
system that allowed secret slush funds and other off-the-books accounting
techniques" on the theory that "[a]ccounting misconduct of this kind
undermined the integrity of corporate books and records, an essential element of
the reporting system administered by the SEC.' 17
As a result of the SEC program and public scandals involving alleged
bribery by U.S. companies of officials in Japan, Mexico, Italy, and the
Netherlands, Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977.18 In doing so, Congress gave
the SEC the amendments to the securities laws it requested, thereby requiring
all issuers to maintain accurate books and records and to implement internal
controls, both at the parent company and at controlled subsidiaries. 19 However,
it went further and enacted a specific prohibition against paying bribes to
foreign officials, applicable not only to issuers but to any U.S. person or
1 3 See id
14 Kathleen A. Lacey et al., Assessing the Deterrent Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's
Certification Provisions: A Comparative Analysis Using the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397, 416 (2005); see also S. COMM. ON BANKING, Hous., &
URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., REP. OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 6-7 (Comm. Print 1976) (discussing creation of
voluntary disclosure program).
15 Robert Cyran, Rob Cox & David Vise, Gates Should Weigh Microsoft Breakup,
WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115050746420383142.html.
16 Stanley Sporkin, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, The Saxe
Lectures in Accounting: A Regulator Responds (Dec. 18, 1978), available at http:/
newman.baruch.cuny.edu/digital/saxe/saxe_1978/sporkin_78.htm.
17Lacey, supra note 14, at 417.
18 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
19See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)-(7) (2006).
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entity.20 Both the books-and-records provisions and the anti-bribery provisions
carried the risk of criminal or civil enforcement and significant fines. 2 1
III. DEFENSE INDUSTRY INITIATIVE
The combination of the FCPA's requirement that issuers adopt internal
financial controls and some of the early FCPA prosecutions encouraged
corporations to adopt anti-corruption compliance programs. Although some of
these programs were admittedly rudimentary, certain industries that viewed
themselves as particularly at risk, already highly regulated, or already the target
of enforcement actions, led the way.
One of the earliest examples of an industry compliance code can be found
in the defense industry. In 1985, the defense industry was faced with allegations
of widespread criminal misconduct and government mismanagement. 22 To
address the issue, President Reagan appointed the "The President's Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management" (the Packard Commission) to
recommend reforms. 23 The Packard Commission produced an Interim Report in
February 1986 in which it observed that waste, fraud, and abuse had eroded the
public's confidence in the defense industry and the Department of Defense. 24
"The Commission urged defense contractors to improve the defense acquisition
process through greater self-governance," 2 5 stating: "To assure that their houses
are in order, defense contractors must promulgate and vigilantly enforce codes
of ethics that address the unique problems and procedures incident to defense
procurement.... They must also develop and implement internal controls to
monitor these codes of ethics and sensitive aspects of contract compliance." 26
Subsequently, executives from eighteen defense contractors voluntarily met
and drafted the principles that became known as the Defense Industry Initiative
on Business Ethics and Conduct (DII).27 By July 1986, thirty-two major defense
contractors had pledged to adopt DI's core principles, which included
developing and training employees in written Codes of Conduct, encouraging
20 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (2006). In 1998, the statute was amended to apply to
non-U.S. persons who took any act in furtherance of a foreign bribe within the territory of
the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2006).
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g); id. § 78m(b)(4) (5).
2 2 Origins of D11, DEF. INDUSTRY INITIATIVE ON Bus. ETHICS & CONDUCT, http:/




2 6PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON DEF. MGMT., A QUEST FOR EXCELLENCE:
FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, at xxix (1986).2 7 Origins of D1l, supra note 22.
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internal reporting of violations thereof, and self-monitoring for compliance with
federal procurement laws. 2 8
No compliance code, however, will prevent willful misconduct and evasion
of controls. In subsequent years, a number of signatories to the DII ran afoul of
the FCPA, with enforcement actions against General Electric, 2 9 Lockheed
Corporation, 30 IBM,3 1 and Textron 32 based on either their own actions or those
of their overseas subsidiaries.
IV. GOVERNMENT COMPLIANCE GUIDANCE
In the early years of the FCPA, there was a fair amount of uncertainty as to
how the statute would be applied. Representatives from DOJ admitted: "The
interpretive questions arising under the Act depend on subtle judgments of fact
and law. We're dealing with a new Act, where no one has much enforcement
experience. It is an Act that presents questions there has never been occasion to
address in domestic bribery law .... -33 Shortly after enactment of the FCPA,
President Carter noted in his export policy statement the hope that "American
business will not forego legitimate export opportunities because of uncertainty
about the application of [the FCPA]" and asked DOJ to provide some form of
guidance to the business community. 34 Over time, the guidance came in various
forms, such as DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases, the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, DOJ Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations,
through various FCPA settlements, and through the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (the OECD).
A. DOJFCPA Opinion Procedure Releases
To resolve uncertainty specific to the interpretation of the FCPA, the
Department established procedures to "enable issuers and domestic concerns to
obtain an opinion of the Attorney General as to whether certain specified,
prospective-not hypothetical-conduct conforms with the Department's
present enforcement policy regarding the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign
2 8 See id.
2 9 See United States v. Steindler, No. CR-1-94-29-1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 1994).
30 See United States v. Lockheed Corp., No. 1:94-CR-226, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22529, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 1994).
31 See Int'l Bus. Machs., Exchange Act Release No. 58504, available at www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/34-43761.htm.
3 2 See Notice of Plea and Plea Agreement, United States v. Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV-
01505 (D.D.C. July 10, 1979).
3 3 AM. BANKER, supra note 1, at 8.
34 1d.
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Corrupt Practices Act."135 The SEC does not have a separate opinion procedure
release process; rather, in 1980, the SEC declared its decision to follow the
guidance announced through DOJ's Opinion Release Procedure.
36
Fifty-six FCPA opinions have been released to date, covering a range of
topics such as charitable contributions, gifts and entertainment, commissions,
and hiring foreign agents/representatives. 37 However, given the relative dearth
of opinions (only one opinion was released in 2011)38 and their limited
precedential value (proffered opinions only bind DOJ with respect to the facts at
issue and are not intended to provide safe harbors to parties other than the
requestor),39 the FCPA opinions have had only relatively minor impact on
corporate compliance.
B. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
In November 1991, the U.S. Sentencing Commission released the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations. 40 The Guidelines' approach, which
entailed providing both guidance and incentives for compliance programs, has
been described as "path breaking." 4 1 At the time, Judge William W. Wilkins,
Jr., then Chairman of the Commission, wrote:
[T]he "carrot and stick" approach of the guidelines for organizations, with its
heavy reliance on ... compliance programs, must still be viewed as
developmental. If organizations ignore this exploratory invitation to shield
3528 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2008); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(e) (2006). The FCPA was
amended in 1988 to also require the Attorney General to consider whether additional general
guidance should be published. Ultimately, DOJ, after soliciting public comment, determined
that it was not necessary and instead published a "Lay-man's Guide to the FCPA." FCPA:
Lay-Person's Guide, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf. More recently, however, DOJ has announced that it is, in fact,
preparing official guidance. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Assistant Attorney General
Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the 26th National Conference on the FCPA (Nov. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2011 /crm-speech-1 11 108.html.
36 See SEC Release No. 34-17099, 45 Fed. Reg. 174 (Sept. 5, 1980). A second SEC
Release, No. 34-18255, 46 Fed. Reg. 222 (Nov. 18, 1981), held that the SEC would continue
to adhere to the policy announced in Release No. 34-17099.
37 See Opinion Procedure Releases, U.S. Dep't of Justice, available at http://www.
justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion.
38 Id
3 9 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.16 (2008).
4 0 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (1991) (amended 2004).
41 Jeffrey M. Kaplan, The Sentencing Guidelines: Field Notes on a 20-year Experiment,
FCPA BLOG (Oct. 26, 2011, 6:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011 /10/26/the-
sentencing-guidelines-field-notes-on-a-20-year-experimen.html.
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against potential liability with well-designed and rigorously implemented
compliance systems, it is doubtful this new approach will endure. 42
While the "stick" approach of increased enforcement has certainly gained a
degree of prominence (especially in light of the increased number of FCPA
cases in the past decade), corporations have indeed accepted this "exploratory
invitation" and have devoted considerable effort to developing effective
compliance programs.
The "carrot" under the Guidelines is the possibility of significantly reduced
sentences for corporations that have adequate compliance programs.4 3 To earn
this reduction, corporations must have effective compliance and ethics
programs that comport with specific minimum requirements set forth in the
Guidelines. These requirements are designed to ensure that the corporation
"exercise[s] due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct; and otherwise
promote[s] an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a
commitment to compliance with the law." 44
Prior to 2010, the Guidelines disqualified a corporation from being awarded
for its compliance program where "high-level personnel" were involved with or
should have known about the criminal conduct.4 5 In 2010, the Commission
amended (with congressional approval) 4 6 the Guidelines to provide that, subject
to a few conditions, an organization can still be credited for having an effective
compliance and ethics program-even where high-level personnel were
involved with or should have known about the criminal conduct at issue.4 7
C. Metcalf & Eddy and Morgan Stanley
Over the years, DOJ and the SEC have provided guidance included in
enforcement actions. Two FCPA actions in particular stand out in the unusually
specific attention the enforcement authorities paid to compliance and ethics
programs. In the 1999 case of United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, DOJ for the first
time provided a detailed list of elements that the defendant corporation should
42 William W. Wilkins, Jr., Foreword to JEFFREY M. KAPLAN ET AL., COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PREVENTING CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL LIABILITY, at xlii (1993).
43 Under the Guidelines, if a guilty organization has an effective compliance and ethics
program that was in place at the time of the offense, the court will subtract three points from
its culpability score. The difference can be significant: a fine of $1-2 million would be
reduced to $0.4-0.8 million. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)(1)
(2010).
44 1d. § 8B2.1 (a)(1)-(2) (2010).
4 5 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)(3)(A) (1991) (stating that credit
for effective compliance and ethics program not applicable if high-level personnel
"participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense").46 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2006).
47See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f)(3)(C) (2010).
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include in its remedial compliance and ethics program. 4 8 Over a decade later,
Morgan Stanley's excellent compliance program completely shielded the
company from being prosecuted for the misdeeds of one of its employees.
In Metcalf & Eddy, the architectural and engineering services firm allegedly
paid for unauthorized travel expenses for the chairman of an Egyptian sanitary
and drainage organization and his family.49 In a rare civil action by DOJ,
Metcalf & Eddy agreed to maintain a carefully defined compliance program
designed to detect and prevent violations of the FCPA.50 The consent identified
several critical elements of the program, building upon the Sentencing
Guidelines while providing more concrete (and practical) guidance in the FCPA
context. For example, the consent calls for the establishment and maintenance
of a committee to review the retention of third-party agents for business
development in a foreign jurisdiction as well as the suitability of all prospective
joint venture partners. 5 1 The consent also prescribes that all contracts and
contract renewals contain terms and conditions providing for termination if the
other party breaches the requisite anti-bribery representations and warranties. 52
The legacy of Metcalf & Eddy continues today, with DOJ continuing to
provide "best practices" guidance in its corporate settlements. In recent years,
plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, and non-prosecution
agreements have all included an appendix listing the minimum elements
required of a compliance program. 53 The appendices include the Metcalf &
Eddy elements but provide additional guidance including:
" specifically requiring procedures covering gifts, hospitality,
entertainment, expenses, customer travel, political contributions,
charitable donations, sponsorships, facilitation payments and
solicitation and extortion;
" recommending the use of risk assessments addressing the individual
circumstances and particular bribery risks of the company; and
" recommending periodic review and testing of the company's anti-
corruption standards and procedures. 54
4 8 See generally Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Ancillary Relief, United
States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., No. 99-CV-12566 (D. Mass. 1999); Final Judgment of
Permanent Injunction Against Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, No.
99-CV-12566 (D. Mass. 1999).
4 9 See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Ancillary Relief at para. 21, United
States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., No. 99-CV-12566 (D. Mass. 1999).
50 See generally Consent and Undertaking of Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., United States v.
Metcalf& Eddy, No. 99-CV-12566 (D. Mass. 1999).
5 1 1d. at para. 4(c).
52 Id. at para. 4(i).
53 See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at C-I to C-7, United States v. Bizjet Int'l
Sales & Support, Inc., No. 12-CR-61 (N.D. Okla. 2012).
5 4 See id. at C-2 to C-3.
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Meanwhile, DOJ and the SEC recently displayed a concrete "carrot" in their
enforcement actions against Garth Peterson, former managing director of
Morgan Stanley's business in China.55 According to court documents, Peterson
circumvented Morgan Stanley's internal controls to transfer a multi-million
dollar ownership interest in a Shanghai building to himself and a Chinese
official of a state-owned enterprise with whom he had a personal friendship. 56
The SEC and DOJ charged Peterson with FCPA violations, but declined to
prosecute his employer Morgan Stanley, specifically crediting Morgan
Stanley's strong compliance program. As Forbes noted:
Both the DOJ and SEC took a pass [from prosecuting Morgan Stanley]: very
unusual in this context. Even more unusual was that the DOJ went out of their
way to explain that Morgan Stanley benefited-to the point of getting a
declination from its pre-existing compliance program....
Even the wording of the press release shows respect for Morgan Stanley's
compliance. It used phrases like "the defendant used a web of deceit to thwart
Morgan Stanley's" compliance program.5
7
D. U.S. DOJ's Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations
The government's decision to decline prosecution of Morgan Stanley
reflects a concrete example of DOJ's Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Principles), first promulgated in 1999.58 While the
Principles make clear that a compliance program does not absolve a corporation
from criminal liability, 59 they reflect the Department's policy that an effective
compliance program is a relevant factor affecting prosecutorial discretion. Of
significance here, the Principles include the following factors to guide a
prosecutor in determining whether to charge a corporation:
5 5 United States v. Peterson, No. 12-CR-224, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66025, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. May 9, 2012).
5 6 See id. at *4.
57Howard Sklar, The Most Marketable Compliance Qfficer in the World, FORBES (Apr.
30, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/howardsklar/2012/04/30/the-most-marketable-
compliance-officer-in-the-world/.
58 Memorandum from Eric Holder on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations
to Dep't Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, at § VII (June 16, 1999), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/reports/1999/charging-corps.pdf. In 2008, the
Principles were included in the U.S. Attorney's Manual. See U.S. Dep't. of Justice,
Attorneys' Manual, tit. 9, ch. 9-28.800, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations, Corporate Compliance Programs [hereinafter Principles], available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading room/usam/title9/title9.htm.
5 9 See Principles, supra note 58, at ch. 9-28.900.
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" "the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the
complicity in, or condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management"; 60
" "the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and
its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents"; 6 1
* "the existence and effectiveness of the corporation's pre-existing
compliance program"; 62 and
" "the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement
an effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing
one, to replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant
government agencies." 63
The Principles also identify a number of factors to consider in evaluating
the effectiveness of a compliance program: "the comprehensiveness of the
compliance program; the extent and pervasiveness of the criminal conduct; the
number and level of the corporate employees involved; the seriousness,
duration, and frequency of the misconduct; and any remedial actions taken by
the corporation, including ... disciplinary action ... and revisions to corporate
compliance programs." 6 4 The latest versions of the Principles also refer to the
adequacy of corporate governance mechanisms; for example, "whether the
corporation's directors exercise independent review over proposed corporate
actions." 65 The Principles make clear that corporations should ensure that
compliance programs are more than merely "paper program[s]": that is, the
program is "designed, implemented, reviewed, and revised, as appropriate, in an
effective manner," supported by "staff sufficient to audit, document, analyze,
and utilize the results of the corporation's compliance efforts," and
communicated to the corporation's employees and agents so they are
"adequately informed about the compliance program and are convinced of the
corporation's commitment to it."'66
E. OECD and UN Guidance
Beginning in the late 1990s, the FCPA went global with a series of
international agreements. The most significant of these was the 1997 OECD
60 1d. at ch. 9-28.300(A)(2).
61 Id. at ch. 9-28.300(A)(4).
62 Id. at ch. 9-28.300(A)(5). The phrase "pre-existing," underlined in the original, was
introduced in the 2006 version. The emphasis was removed, but the phrase retained, when
the Principles were incorporated in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual in 2008.6 31d. at ch. 9-28.300(A)(6).
64 Id. at ch. 9-28.800(B).
6 5 Principles, supra note 58, at ch. 9-28.800(B).
66 1d.
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Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions (the OECD Convention). 6 7 The OECD Convention
recognized that "all countries share a responsibility to combat bribery in
international business transactions," 68 and provided the international framework
for the global prosecution of cross-border corruption. The OECD Working
Group on Bribery is charged with conducting peer reviews to monitor the
parties' implementation of the convention. In addition to country-specific
evaluations, it has conducted "horizontal reviews" to identify widespread
practices, both good and bad. One of these reviews resulted in the OECD
Council issuing a Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, notable in particular for
its "Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance. '"6 9
This Guidance largely tracks the elements set out in the DOJ Appendices.
F. The U.K Bribery Act 2010
In 2010, after many years of false starts, the U.K. finally enacted a
comprehensive reform of its anti-corruption statutes. The U.K. Bribery Act
201070 includes prohibitions on paying and receiving bribes, both for domestic
and foreign officials and between private commercial parties. Uniquely, it
contains a strict liability criminal provision holding corporations accountable
for bribery by an "associated person"-defined as lower-level employees,
agents, and other third parties7 l-but offers an affirmative defense to the
corporation if the bribery took place despite the existence of "adequate
procedures" to prevent it. 72
In May 2011, the U.K. Ministry of Justice issued official guidance on what
type of program would qualify for the adequate procedures defense. 73 This
guidance is, again, similar to that found in the DOJ Appendices and the OECD
Guidance, with some additional detail. The guidance emphasizes the affirmative
67 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
(2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-
briberyconvention/38028044.pdf [hereinafter OECD Convention].6 8 1d. at pmbl.
6 9 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL
FOR FURTHER COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Nov. 26, 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/
briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/ 44176910.pdf.70 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
7 1 See id. at c. 23, § 8.
7 2 1d. atc. 23, § 7(1).
7 3 See U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE (2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf;
see also Philip Urofsky, Stephen Fishbein & Richard Kelly, The UK Bribery Act 2010, REV.
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG., Aug. 17, 2011, at 171.
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defense available to companies that have adequate procedures in place to
prevent bribery, and provides six principles of bribery prevention: proportionate
procedures, top-level commitment, risk assessment, due diligence,
communication (including training), and monitoring and review. 74 The six
principles are not prescriptive, and are intended to be flexible-thus as an
additional aid, the guidance provides case studies that illustrate potential
scenarios that relate to each of the principles. 7 5
V. SOFT ENFORCEMENT V. CONVICTIONS
Although the first two decades following the enactment of the FCPA saw
some notable cases against some of the United States' most prominent
corporations, recent years have seen a significant uptick in the frequency, scope,
and severity of FCPA actions. 76 In particular, since 2007, DOJ and the SEC
have brought a record number of actions, with corresponding increases in the
size of penalties meted out to corporations and individuals. 77 This "new era" of
more aggressive prosecution has, in turn, encouraged corporations to pay even
greater attention to their internal compliance programs, matching the "hard"
enforcement with "soft" enforcement.
A. OECD Recognition
The value and effectiveness of corporate "soft" enforcement has been
recognized by the OECD Working Group on Bribery (the Working Group) in
its reports on U.S. compliance with the OECD Convention. In its 2002 report,
while recognizing the corporate perception that DOJ and the SEC had
demonstrated their "willingness to prosecute large and medium-sized
companies, and often high-level officers of those companies, alleged to have
been involved in violations of the FCPA throughout the world," 78 the Working
74 U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 73, at 20 31.
7 5 See id at 6. The U.K. Ministry of Justice was careful to note, however, that the case
studies are merely illustrative and should not be seen as "standard setting, establishing any
presumption, reflecting a minimum baseline of action or being appropriate for all
organizations whatever their size." Id at 32.
76 See Pete J. Georgis, Settling with Your Hands Tied: Why Judicial Intervention Is
Needed to Curb an Expanding Interpretation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 42
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 243, 246 (2012) ("Since 2004, the U.S. government has devoted
vast resources toward prosecuting FCPA violations.").
7 7 See PHILIP UROFSKY, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: RECENT TRENDS
AND PATTERNS IN FCPA ENFORCEMENT 3-4 (July 2012), available at
http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/e6d23fl f-9d58-4aa5-ae61 -b2122928ce 18/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 0085 db08-378 f-4bcf-a366-c7ce9e28e2baIFCPA-
Digest-Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-073012.pdf.
7 8 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REPORT ON APPLICATION OF THE
CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL
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Group took stock-for the first time in any report issued by a governmental
body-of the role and utility of corporate compliance programs as a measure of
the effectiveness of U.S. anti-corruption efforts. The Working Group
acknowledged that these corporate compliance programs had developed in
response to the "powerful incentives" generated by FCPA enforcement, quoting
one member of the bar as stating that "corporate compliance programs are the
single most important measure contributing to prevention and deterrence." 79
The Working Group approvingly noted that "[c]ompliance programs are by
now well-developed and well-understood among large public companies," 80 due
in part to a "wealth of material" available on anti-corruption policies and "the
emphasis placed on promoting... [their use] by in-house counsel and the
private Bar." 8 1 The Working Group noted, however, that corporate compliance
programs had not been uniformly adopted throughout the business community.
For example, the Working Group found that compliance policies are "more
extensively and intensively taught, understood, and implemented within the
U.S. than internationally, where the problem of bribery is most likely to
arise[,]" citing evidence that companies generally perform more monitoring
activities at home than abroad. 82 In addition, it noted that a "significant number
of small companies operating in the international market ... do business
without a compliance program." 83 The OECD Report expressed concern that
small and medium-size U.S. enterprises doing business outside of the U.S. were
"slip[ping] through the net" for a variety of reasons, including "less experience,
less awareness and fewer resources" to implement compliance programs
sufficient to detect and deter foreign bribery. 84
In its subsequent reports, 85 the Working Group found that the United States
had made expansive efforts to raise the level of awareness of both the FCPA
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATTING BRIBERY IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 6 (Oct. 2002), available at http://www.oecd
.org/investment/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/1 962084.pdf
[hereinafter OECD, REPORT ON APPLICATION].
7 9 1d. at 17.
801d. at 18.
8 1 1d. at 17.
82 1d. at 18.
8 3 1d.
84 OECD, REPORT ON APPLICATION, supra note 78, at 19.
8 5 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., UNITED STATES: PHASE 2: FOLLOW-UP
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PHASE 2 RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE APPLICATION
OF THE CONVENTION AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (June 1, 2005), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/35/35109576.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
UNITED STATES: PHASE 3: REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND
THE 2009 REVISED RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL FCPA
AND THE OECD CONVENTION (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
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and the OECD Convention. These efforts included training to those who
provide counseling to U.S. businesses on foreign markets, seeking to have the
issue raised in programs administered by private sector organizations, and
producing a guide on business ethics geared towards those new to international
trade. 86
In its most recent report, the Working Group focused on the effects of the
"substantial enforcement" of the FCPA.87 The examiners reported that they had
spent equal time with government and non-government representatives-a
departure from its practice in 2002-to assess the implications of this high level
of enforcement on the private sector and, in particular, to "ensure adequate time
to assess the impact of the high level of enforcement ... on corporate
compliance." 88 In these meetings, the examiners heard that heavier sanctions
combined with the active enforcement by DOJ and SEC had spurred serious
efforts to improve private-sector anti-bribery measures, internal controls, books
and records, and compliance systems.8 9 Non-government representatives also
pointed to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the SEC's criticisms of specific
internal controls failures as providing encouragement to establish effective
compliance policies. 90 The Working Group reported that representatives from
all business sectors understood the need for internal audits of foreign
subsidiaries in particular, and that all private sector participants had hotlines for
anonymous whistleblower reporting. 9 1
B. Current Industry Codes
Vigorous FCPA enforcement has also resulted in more rigorous corporate
standards and the rise in comprehensive industry codes directed at bribery
issues. Similar to the earlier DII, these codes set out rules to ensure transparency
and prevent corruption in high-risk industries, particularly where those
industries do business in corruption-prone countries, are multinational in scope,
and tend to work closely with government entities. For example, the Wall Street
Journal recently reported "[t]he world drugs industry is tightening its code of
practice in an attempt to clamp down on corruption and bribery, particularly in
emerging markets." 92 Below, we examine the industry compliance codes in the
pharmaceuticals industry and extractive industry.
10/49/46213841 .pdf [hereinafter OECD, UNITED STATES: PHASE 3].
86 See generally supra note 85.87 OECD, UNITED STATES: PHASE 3, supra note 85, at 11.
8 81d. at6.
8 9 See id. at 11.
90 See id. at 30.
91 See id.
92 Sten Stovall, Stronger Code of Practice for Global Pharma Industry, WALL ST. J.
THE SOURCE (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2012/03/01/stronger-
code-of-practice-for-global-pharma-industry/.
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1. Pharmaceuticals
Geneva-based International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
and Associations (IFPMA) is a non-profit, non-governmental organization
representing associations and companies in the pharmaceutical industry. 93 The
U.S.-based member association is the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), which includes virtually every major
multinational pharmaceutical company. 94
The IFPMA Code of Practice, initially adopted in 1981, 95 was revised in
2012, possibly as a response to increased scrutiny of the industry by U.S.
enforcement officials. Indeed, in the last several years, global pharmaceutical
companies involved in both organizations-whose business in developing
countries often involves sales to state-run health systems-have been the targets
of an industry "sweep" by the SEC and DOJ for FCPA violations. 96 The revised
Code of Practice extends the standards beyond marketing practices to cover all
interactions with healthcare professionals, medical institutions, and patient
organizations. The Code's guiding principles state "[p]harmaceutical
companies' interactions with stakeholders must at all times be ethical,
appropriate and professional. Nothing should be offered or provided by a
company in a manner or on conditions that would have an inappropriate
influence." 97 Among other provisions, the IFPMA Code prohibits payments in
cash and gifts to health care professionals and restricts the use of "promotional
aids" to those relevant to the practice of the healthcare professional and of
minimal value and quantity.98
The IFPMA also stresses the role of compliance training, calling for
companies to "establish and maintain appropriate procedures to ensure
compliance with relevant codes and applicable laws and to review and monitor
all activities and materials in that regard" and to "ensure that relevant
9 3About IFPMA: Welcome, INT'L FED'N OF PHARMACEUTICAL MFRS. & ASS'NS,
http://www.ifpma.org/about-ifpma/welcome.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
94 About PhRMA, PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., http://www.phrma
.org/about/about-phrma (last visited Nov. 18, 2012); Member Companies, PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., http://www.phrma.org/about/member-companies (last visited
Nov. 18, 2012).9 5Foreword to IFPMA CODE OF PRACTICE (Int'l Fed'n of Pharm. Mfrs. & Ass'ns
2012).
96 See Samuel Rubenfield, Pharma Code Revamp Follows US Industry Sweep, WALL
ST. J. CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Mar. 1, 2012, 5:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2012/03/01 /pharma-code-revamp-follows-us-industry-sweep/ (citing 2011 FCPA
settlement by Johnson & Johnson, and disclosure of investigations for possible FCPA
violations by AstraZeneca, Merck & Co., and other pharmaceutical companies).9 7 IFPMA CODE OF PRACTICE, Guiding Principles on Ethical Conduct and Promotion
(Int'l Fed'n of Pharm. Mfrs. & Ass'ns 2012).9 81d. at art. 7.1.3.
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employees receive training appropriate to their role." 99 Each of the member
associations maintain separate Codes that reflect the provisions set out in the
IFPMA Code,' 0 0 and it encourages member associations to "include provisions
intended to assure compliance with their national codes."'' 1
2. Mining, Oil, and Gas
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is an initiative
implemented by thirty-seven resource-rich countries, established to promote
transparency and accountability in the extractive industries. 10 2 The EITI
principles and criteria require, among other things, "[r]egular publication of all
material oil, gas and mining payments by companies to governments ... and all
material revenues received by government from oil, gas and mining
companies... to a wide audience in a publicly accessible, comprehensive and
comprehensible manner." 10 3 The EITI also calls for such payments and
revenues to be subject to credible independent audits to confirm the veracity of
those publications. 10 4 The requirements for implementing the EITI are brought
together in the EITI Rules. 105
EITI compliance is assessed according to a "validation methodology"
involving the EITI board and various stakeholders, and each EITI signatory
country is assigned "candidate" or "compliant" status. Validation is not an
audit; rather, it evaluates EITI implementation in consultation with
stakeholders, verifies achievements with reference to the EITI global standard,
identifies opportunities to strengthen the EITI process going forward, and
determines a country's "candidate" or "compliant" status. 10 6 Currently sixteen
countries are in "compliant" status, 10 7 while twenty-one are "candidate"
9 9 Id. at art. 12.1 -2.
100 See, e.g., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE PROF'LS (Pharm. Research &
Mfrs. of Am. 2008).
101 IFPMA CODE OF PRACTICE art 13.2 (Int'l Fed'n of Pharm. Mfrs. & Ass'ns 2012).
102 EITI Countries, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE,
http://eiti.org/countries (last visited Nov. 18, 2012); The E1T1 Principles and Criteria,
EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/eiti/principles (last visited
Nov. 18, 2012).
10 3 EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, EITI RULES 11 (Sam Bartlett &
Kjerstin Andreasen eds., Apr. 2011), available at http://eiti.org/files/2011-11-01 2011
EITI RULES.pdf.104 Id
10 5 See id. at 13.
106 See id. at 34 54.
107They include: Azerbaijan, Central African Republic, Ghana, Kyrgyz Republic,
Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Timor-
Leste, Yemen, and Zambia. See EITI Countries, supra note 102.
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countries. 10 8 A number of governments have endorsed the LITI (including those
of Australia, Canada, the U.K., the U.S., and the EU), 109 and over sixty "of the
world's largest oil, gas and mining companies have chosen to become EITI
Supporting Companies."1 10
C. M&A Effects
A final area in which the impact of heightened FCPA enforcement can be
readily observed-indeed, cannot be ignored-is increasingly stringent FCPA
due diligence conducted in the mergers and acquisitions context. DOJ and the
SEC have taken the position that a successor company can be held criminally
and civilly liable for a predecessor's pre-acquisition violations. The M&A boom
between the years 2005 and 2008 produced public examples in which M&A
deals were complicated, delayed, or terminated due to FCPA concerns.1 11 But
here again, the FCPA's effectiveness can be measured not by the number of
M&A-related enforcement matters, but rather by the way that the heightened
threat of liability created incentives for self-regulation and private enforcement
by business entities.
One of the most dramatic (and expensive) examples of this was the
abandoned merger between defense contractors Lockheed Martin Corporation
and The Titan Corporation. In 2003, Lockheed entered an agreement to acquire
Titan but during due diligence learned that Titan had made improper payments
through third-party agents in several foreign countries. 112 As a condition of
going forward, Lockheed caused Titan to "involuntarily" disclose its FCPA
violations to DOJ and the SEC but, even then, ultimately walked away when
Titan was unable to reach an acceptable resolution with the government.'113
108 They include: Afghanistan, Albania, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, C6te-d'Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guatemala, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
Madagascar (candidate status temporarily suspended), Republic of the Congo, Sao Tom6
and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Togo, and Trinidad and Tobago. See
E1TI Countries, supra note 102.
10 9 Stakeholders: Countries, EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://
eiti.org/supporters/countries (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
110 Id.
111 See PHILIP UROFSKY & DANFORTH NEWCOMB, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, RECENT
TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN FCPA ENFORCEMENT 10 11 (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/LIT FCPA Trends 121208.pdf; see also id. at 10
("[I]t is important to recognize that recent dramatic swell in the overall number of mergers
and acquisitions increased the overall likelihood that violations discovered in the course of
due diligence will be specifically FCPA-related.").
112 Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained for: Successor Liability Under the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 959, 971 (2009).
1 1 3 See id; see also PHILIP UROFSKY & DANFORTH NEWCOMB, SHEARMAN & STERLING
LLP, FCPA DIGEST: RECENT TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN
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Nearly one year after the failed merger, Titan entered a guilty plea and settled
with the SEC, agreeing to pay aggregate criminal and civil fines of $28 million,
the largest combined penalty at that time. 114 Not coincidentally, L-3, a
communications company, almost immediately acquired Titan. 115
The 2007 enforcement action against Vetco International Ltd.'s subsidiaries
illustrates that "acquired" FCPA risks can also go severely awry when not
properly addressed through effective compliance programs. In 2004, ABB Ltd.,
a Swiss engineering company, voluntarily disclosed that several of its Vetco
Gray subsidiaries, which it was in the process of spinning off to a private equity
consortium, had made improper payments to government officials in Nigeria. 116
This sale closed after two of those subsidiaries entered guilty pleas and paid a
combined fine of $10.5 million. 117
The new owners subsequently obtained a DOJ Opinion Procedure Release
stating that DOJ would not take any enforcement action against the acquirers
for additional pre-acquisition conduct provided they implemented a rigorous
compliance system, the scope of which was set forth in the Opinion. 118
Following the acquisition, however, the Vetco Gray companies failed to abide
by the Opinion and post-acquisition misconduct by three Vetco subsidiaries
came to light. The result was guilty pleas by the three Vetco subsidiaries and a
$26 million fine, the highest criminal fine in an FCPA matter to that date. 119
Unsurprisingly, the lack of an effective compliance program was cited by DOJ
as a reason for levying the record line against the Vetco subsidiaries. 120
D. Conclusion
Even critics of the FCPA agree that "[a]s the DOJ and the SEC have
increased their enforcement efforts, FCPA due diligence has become a more
important (and more expensive) component of cross-border business
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 17 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/
upload/LT-030509-FCPA-Digest-Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-in-FCPA-Enforcement.pdf.114 News Release, Office of the U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of Cal. (Mar. 1, 2005), available
at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/titan-corp/03-01-05titan-pr-plea.pdf.
115 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, L-3 to Acquire Titan, Expanding Share of Military Market,
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2005, at C2.
"l6Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. and ABB Vetco Gray
UK Ltd. Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges (July 6, 2004), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04 crm_465.htm.
117 1d
ll 8 See Opinion Procedure Release No. 04-02, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Review (July 12, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/ opinion/ 2004/0402.pdf.
119 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Vetco Int'l Ltd. Subsidiaries Plead Guilty
to Foreign Bribery and Agree to Pay $26 Million in Criminal Fines (Feb. 6, 2007), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/February/07 crm 075.html.
120 Id.
1164 [Vol. 73:5
THE FALLACIES OF REFORM
transactions." 12 1 Whereas in the past corporate executives may have swept
corruption issues under the rug in potentially lucrative transactions, today
"significant corporate attention [is] now devoted to detecting and resolving
FCPA issues prior to closing M&A transactions"1 2 2 and companies are
"expend [ing] more resources on a 'deeper dive' into the potential counterparty's
business practices than would have been expected a decade ago."' 123 This
diligence can, in turn, act not only as a substantial source of assistance to U.S.
regulators seeking to detect violations of the FCPA, but it can also assist
acquiring companies to identify and rout out bribery and corruption issues
internally. This "soft enforcement," although obviously a reaction to the
government's "hard enforcement" efforts, more accurately represents the
success and effectiveness of the FCPA than the number of cases brought against
corporations or individuals, the length of sentences imposed, or the amount of
fines collected.
VI. THE FALLACIES OF REFORM
Although abundant evidence indicates that the government's aggressive but
targeted approach to FCPA enforcement has had a significant impact on
preventing and deterring foreign bribery, the current FCPA regime is not
without its detractors. As awareness of the FCPA has increased, so too has the
criticism volleyed at the statute's purported deficiencies by some practitioners
and legal scholars. More recently, the Chamber of Commerce has also joined in
attacking the FCPA's application, arguing that the statute's growing reach has
significant anti-competitive consequences for U.S. companies doing business
abroad. 12 4 Unsurprisingly, the Chamber's central thesis is that "[t]he current
FCPA enforcement environment has been costly to business."' 2 5
121 COMM. ON INT'L Bus. TRANSACTIONS, N.Y.C. BAR ASS'N, THE FCPA AND ITS
IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS-SHOULD ANYTHING BE DONE TO
MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE U.S.'S UNIQUE POSITION ON COMBATING OFFSHORE
CORRUPTION? 9 (2011), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAlmpacton
InternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf [hereinafter N.Y.C. BAR REPORT].
122 Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition
Transactions: Successor Liability and Its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 247, 292
(2010).
123 N.Y.C. BAR REPORT, supra note 121, at 9.
124 Not all business leaders agree that the FCPA requires reform. Bill O'Rourke, an
Alcoa VP, for example, has publically praised the FCPA for prompting companies to
implement ethics and compliance training programs and allowing U.S. companies to take a
stronger stance against bribery. Joe Palazzolo, Alcoa Exec Says Business Leaders Should
Stick Up for the FCPA, WALL ST. J. CORRUPTION CURRENTS (June 24, 2011, 3:41 PM),
http: //blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/06/24/alcoa-exec-says-business-leaders-
should-stick-up-for-the-fcpal.
12 5 ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
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In our view, most of these criticisms are unfounded and built on strawmen.
Others seem intended to repeal the FCPA sub rosa by proposing "solutions"
that would essentially gut the law and render it toothless. Finally, a few
accurately describe the real-world difficulty and cost of complying with the
FCPA and its foreign counterparts but propose remedies that have significant
flaws. In this section, we summarize these criticisms and the solutions proposed
by the critics and then outline some of their flaws and fallacies. We also,
however, offer some suggestions of our own.
A. The Criticisms
1. Ambiguity
A perennial critique of the FCPA is that it is a "vague statute" which has
been interpreted largely through settlements rather than through judicial review,
with the result that very little guidance is available regarding what specific
conduct is prohibited. 126 These criticisms focus particularly on the meaning of
"agency or instrumentality" of a foreign government-whether, for example,
employees of state-owned enterprises might be foreign officials under the
FCPA. 127 Similar attacks are made on the "to obtain or retain business" element
and the government's allegedly overbroad interpretation of the "knowledge"
requirement set forth in the FCPA's third party payment provisions. 128 From a
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 5 (2010), available at http://www.institute
forlegalreform.com/sites/default/files/restoringbalance fcpa.pdf [hereinafter CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE REPORT].126 See, e.g., Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?,
63 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1273 (2008); James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal
for Change in Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 Bus. LAW. 1233, 1233
(2007); Mike Koehler, The Faqade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907, 909
(2010) [hereinafter Koehler, Facade]; Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement,
Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA.
L. REV. 489, 494-97 (2011); N.Y.C. BAR REPORT, supra note 121, at 3-4.
12 7 See Cohen et al., supra note 126, at 1273; Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 410,
413 (2010); Westbrook, supra note 126, at 534-35.
12 8 Georgis, supra note 76, at 246-48, 258; Koehler, Facade, supra note 126, at 971 76;
Westbrook, supra note 126, at 540-41, 544-48; see also John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe,
The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an Expanding FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 25, 34 (2012) ("Due to the absence of any substantial case law after more than
34 years, even the most basic elements of the FCPA, like what constitutes a 'bribe' or who is
considered a 'foreign official,' remain largely undefined."); Kenneth Winer & Gregory
Husisian, The 'Knowledge' Requirement of the FCPA Anti-Bribery Provisions: Effectuating
or Frustrating Congressional Intent?, 24 WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 1, 3 (Oct.
2009), available at http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/ald4aa39-1324-4018-bd8a-
I cbddfc 15e02/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7e8b814e-446b-4 11 d-8722-
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compliance perspective, critics raising these concerns claim the FCPA's broad
and uncertain scope may "render corporations and individual officers overly
cautious, avoiding not only objectionable conduct but also acts that should be
permitted and even encouraged."' 2 9
The Chamber of Commerce maintains that it "may not be immediately
apparent whether an individual is considered a 'foreign official' within the
meaning of the act" 130 and that "[w]ithout a clear understanding of what
companies are considered 'instrumentalities,' companies have no way of
knowing whether the FCPA applies to a particular transaction or business
relationship."1 31 However, despite the articles, motions, and expert affidavits,
there is little evidence that the government has stretched the definition beyond
its obvious and predictable meaning. Not surprisingly, this argument has thus
far failed before every district court to which it has been presented and is, in our
view, likely to fail in the Courts of Appeals as well. 132 In recent cases, the
government has elaborated on its approach, providing very specific criteria,
since adopted by the district courts in their decisions and jury instructions, of
what constitutes control; e.g., alleging facts that include government majority
control, the government appointing officers or directors, government officials
sitting on supervisory boards, profits being paid to the government, and
government veto over major expenditures or involvement in important
operational decisions. 133
From a practical, real-world perspective, it is also difficult to see how
"instrumentality" is vague. Although it may be difficult to determine if a
particular entity is or is not a state instrumentality in China, something that may
not even be clear to the Chinese, in most cases in our experience the
information is available if you look, and, if not, one can ask the entity itself. On
a more fundamental level, we have found that many of our clients simply don't
care. They take the position that they are not going to pay bribes to officials of a
public or private entity, full stop. To them, the relevance of the public/private
distinction is limited to whether special rules apply to legitimate marketing
expenditures, not to whether or not to make a corrupt payment. Indeed, this
le747b29b303/FCPAWinerHusisian2009.pdf; Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion,
andthe FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 812-17 (2011).
129 N.Y.C. BAR REPORT, supra note 121, at 11.
13 0 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 6.
131 Id. at 27.
13 2 See Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 through 10 of the
Indictment at 6294, 6299-300, United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal.
May 18, 2011), 2001 WL 5101701, at *1; United States v. Aguilar, 783 F.Supp. 2d 1108,
1120 (C.D. Cal. 2011); United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-21010-CR-Martinez-Brown,
2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 143572, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010); United States v. Nam Quoc
Nguyen, No. 08-cr-00522-TJS (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2009).
133 See, e.g., United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.,Nos. 1:10-cr-20906-MGC-1; 1:10-cr-
20907-MGC-1, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 16143, at *7-13 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010).
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position is becoming increasingly common as the risk of prosecution under
foreign laws such as the U.K. Bribery Act, which prohibits both public and
commercial bribery, 134 becomes more likely; indeed, even in some FCPA cases
the U.S. has prosecuted both aspects of corruption. 135
The critiques involving the FCPA's "business nexus" may have more merit.
The FCPA prohibits quidpro quo payments intended to "assist in obtaining or
retaining business."' 136 For many years, practitioners debated whether the FCPA
was essentially a procurement fraud statute and that the "business," therefore,
had to come from the government. This argument largely ended after the Fifth
Circuit ruled in U.S. v. Kay that the FCPA was not limited to bribes to obtain
business from a foreign government or even to bribes that led "directly to the
award or renewal of contracts." 137 The court warned, however:
Although we recognize that lowering tax and customs payments presumptively
increases a company's profit margin by reducing its cost of doing business, it
does not follow, ipsofacto, . . that such a result satisfies the statutory business
nexus element .... There are bound to be circumstances in which such a cost
reduction does nothing other than increase the profitability of an already-
profitable venture or ensure profitability of some start-up venture. 138
Again, from a compliance perspective, this issue may mean little for
corporations seeking to comply with the law: a bribe is a bribe is a bribe. When
criminal liability is at issue, however, it is important that the borders of the
statute be carefully limned. In our view, the government has overreached in
some cases in which it lumped together "obtain and retain business" bribes with
payments that merely increased profits, such as payments to tax officials to
obtain tax rebates. 139 We are not sure that the answer is an amendment to the
statute, however, much as greater fidelity by the government to the statute as it
exists.
2. Prosecutorial Over-Reaching
Critics also complain that the government's aggressive FCPA theories have
not been subjected to judicial scrutiny because the vehicles used to resolve
FCPA enforcement actions-DOJ non-prosecution agreements ("NPAs"),
134 See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, §§ 6 7 (U.K.).
135 Brief for Petitioner at 5 6, United States v. SSI Int'l Far East, Ltd., No. 06-cr-00398
(D. Or. Oct. 10, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ssi-
intl/10-10-06ssi-information.pdf.
136 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I(a)(1) (2006).
13 7 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 755 (5th Cir. 2004).
1381d. at 759 60.
13 9See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1-3, United States v. Pride Int'l, Inc.,
No. 10-766 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010); Non-Prosecution Agreement, Noble Corp. (Nov. 4,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/noble-npa.pdf.
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deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs), plea agreements, and SEC
settlements-"result [from] private negotiations between the enforcement
agencies and the alleged wrongdoer."' 40 As Professor Mike Koehler has
observed, these negotiations occur "in the context of the enforcement agencies
dangling substantial 'carrots' [before corporations to agree] to
its ... interpretation of the law. At the same time, the alleged wrongdoer is
cognizant of the enforcement agencies' substantial 'sticks' should it disagree
with the enforcement agencies." 141 Some commentators warn that "this
unbridled power has allowed prosecutors to become corporate governance
bullies, forcing corporate defendants to accept the government's interpretation
of the FCPA-no matter how unreasonable or dubious it may appear to be."' 142
Others worry that, without judicial review, key aspects of the FCPA are subject
to incremental expansion "without a legally authoritative articulation."' 143
Echoing the academic concerns about unchecked prosecutorial power, the
Chamber further argues that it is "unfair" for "aggressive or misinformed
prosecutors, who can exploit the power imbalance inherent in the current FCPA
statute" to hold a business with a strong compliance system liable for behaviors
of third-party vendors or errant employees who violate the business's anti-
bribery policies. 144
On one level, the basic premise of this criticism is valid: to date, only two
corporations have taken the government to trial in the thirty-year history of the
FCPA (and both of them ultimately prevailed). 145 All of the over 100
corporations charged with having violated the FCPA have settled, either by
entering guilty pleas or, since 2004, by agreeing to non-judicial resolutions such
as DPAs or NPAs. 146 This does, of course, mean that the government's theories
are tested only insofar as they seek to go beyond what a settling corporation can
stomach.
On the other hand, proponents of this criticism have a difficult time
pointing to specific cases in which the government overreached on the law and,
although we expect there were heated negotiations in those conference rooms as
to the facts, in the end, the corporations that settled did admit to them. Further,
in our view, DPAs and NPAs offer considerable benefits to corporations.
140 Koehler, Faqade, supra note 126, at 909; see also Georgis, supra note 76, at 275;
Westbrook, supra note 126, at 561-63; N.Y.C. BAR REPORT, supra note 121, at 5-6.
141 Koehler, Facade, supra note 126, at 909; see also Westbrook, supra note 126, at
574-76.
142 Ashcroft & Ratcliffe, supra note 126, at 34.
143 Westbrook, supra note 126, at 563.
144 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 7, 13.
14 5 See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (defendants
initially convicted, but convictions later vacated for prosecutorial misconduct); United States
v. Harris Corp., No. 3:90-cr-00456-CAL (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1991) (defendants' motion for
a judgment of acquittal granted).
14 6 See Koehler, Facade, supra note 126, at 932.
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Although they must pay fines and admit to wrongdoing, they achieve a certain
outcome in a reasonable period, thus avoiding drawn-out prosecutions and
trials, with their attendant negative publicity and uncertainty. The argument that
the government overreaches in these agreements because they are not reviewed
by a judge seems to us to put the burden on the wrong party. If a corporation
believes that the government is overreaching on the facts or the law, it should
take the government to court (and we hereby offer our services!).
There is another strand to this argument-that NPAs and DPAs are not
sufficiently punitive and allow corporations to essentially buy their way out of a
conviction. It is true that these agreements allow the corporation eventually to
walk away without a criminal conviction, assuming it fulfills the requirements
of the agreement. Those requirements, however, can be onerous, even more so
than what a court might have imposed after a trial and conviction. For example,
unlike in a civil settlement, the corporation may not "neither admit nor deny"
the facts and must admit to criminal conduct. This may have serious collateral
consequences in private civil litigation, in regulatory actions, in debarment
proceedings, and, in the event of a breach of the agreement, in a future
prosecution. Further, in almost every case, the corporation must agree to some
form of compliance monitoring, which may range from potentially expensive
independent monitors to self-reporting. Finally, the financial penalties assessed
in a DPA or an NPA are based on the Sentencing Guidelines with, at least
recently, a fairly transparent reduction for cooperation; these penalties are thus
comparable to those that would have been imposed in similar circumstances by
a court.
Certainly, in our experience and that of our colleagues, the government can
be unreasonable both in its view of the facts and the law and, knowing that
corporations will not take them to court, government prosecutors have a certain
confidence that they can push the envelope to achieve their desired result. It
would be foolish not to recognize that a corporation has great incentives to
concede rather than challenge disputed facts and legal theories; nevertheless, the
fact is that there is a judicial option available-it is up the corporation, not the
government, to avail itself of it.
3. The Costs of Uncertainty
A third concern that pervades academic literature is the notion that
companies who are unable to predict their risk of liability are likely to engage in
over-compliance or to approach international business transactions with
excessive caution. In this view, "[a]ggressive enforcement, based on an
expansive interpretation of a vague statute, a little-used DOJ opinion process,
and the temptation perhaps to assume that more draconian criminal enforcement
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is better, have all led to a lack of predictability in law enforcement,"' 147 which,
in turn, translates to adoption of "unnecessarily expensive" compliance
programs or internal investigations by risk-averse companies who are "left to
fill in the gaps" regarding the parameters of what conduct is illegal. 148
Compliance is not free-it takes resources to draft procedures, conducting
training, doing due diligence, auditing financial controls, and investigating
alleged wrongdoing. It is possible that the risk of prosecution may cause
businesses to think twice about certain behavior and to adopt a more
conservative approach to making payments to third parties and marketing to
customers. It is questionable, however, whether these costs are any greater than
those required to ensure compliance with other regulatory requirements such as
health, safety, environment, or antitrust.
Further, there is a significant difference between uncertainty arising from
the alleged vagueness of the FCPA and uncertainty resulting from unpredictable
risk of prosecution for violations. The Chamber has never identified a single
prosecution that did not fall squarely within the statute. Instead, it has posited an
unsourced example of a company allegedly spending hundreds of thousands of
dollars in legal fees investigating a taxi ride allegedly provided to a government
official. 14 9 Faced with this example, we have to question why any company
would react as described unless there were additional facts not included in the
Chamber's anecdote. A proper compliance program is designed to keep a
company on the right side of the law. If an issue arises, it must be dealt with in
an appropriate way-one that is scaled to the risk and appropriate to the type of
issue. A full-blown internal investigation may be justified where there is a risk
of serious violations or endemic evasion of controls; isolated and minor lapses
in judgment should most often be dealt with quickly and internally through
counseling and training. If a corporation actually reacted as the Chamber
suggested, it would appear to be less related to the meaning of the FCPA than a
lack ofjudgment at the posited corporation.
14 7 Doty, supra note 126, at 1239; see also Koehler, Faqade, supra note 126, at 984-90,
1000-02 (discussing "carbon-copy ... enforcement actions [that] resulted in materially
different charges").
14 8 Georgis, supra note 76, at 244, 247; see also Koehler, Facade, supra note 126, at
1001 05; Westbrook, supra note 126, at 574 75; Yockey, supra note 128, at 823 25;
N.Y.C. BAR REPORT, supra note 121, at 8-9.14 9 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives,
112th Cong. 56 57 (2011) (statement of The Honorable Michael Mukasey, Partner,
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, speaking on behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform) (relaying an example involving a taxi ride that purportedly occurred at an
unspecified company).
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B. The Proposals
Critics have advanced numerous proposed revisions to the government's
enforcement policies to check the "unruly" expansion of the FCPA and to
prevent the inefficiencies purportedly created by uncertainty surrounding DOJ's
and SEC's interpretation of key FCPA provisions.
1. Significantly Limit Corporate Liability
The Chamber suggests that a compliance defense, which would permit
companies to demonstrate it took reasonable compliance measures, would
increase compliance with the FCPA by providing businesses with an incentive
to "deter, identify, and self-report potential and existing violations."150 Some
academics, too, support the adoption of a compliance defense, arguing that
"[b]y better incentivizing organizations to implement more robust FCPA
policies and procedure[s], an FCPA compliance defense can reduce instances of
improper conduct and thereby advance the FCPA's objectives." 151
This proposal takes its cue from the affirmative defense of "adequate
procedures" in the U.K. Bribery Act. 152 The problem with the proposal in its
current form is that it is simply too easy to erect a fagade of compliance and
allow business to proceed with a wink and nod. A business could have the best
of all worlds-if something happens and it is not discovered, all to the good; if
something happens and it is discovered, then it can point to its check-the-box
compliance program as a defense. Such a defense would work better if it
provided concrete disincentives to non-compliance while still protecting a
corporation that had a good faith and otherwise effective program. As an
example, a compliance defense could allow a qualifying corporation to avoid
the consequences of a criminal or civil enforcement proceeding but still be
required to disgorge the illicit gains.
2. Reg. FCPA
James R. Doty, a former General Counsel of the SEC and current Chairman
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, has proposed addressing
some of these same issues through the formulation and adoption of a "Reg.
FCPA," similar to Regulation D under the Securities Act of 1933, which
"would establish a permissive filing regime; by making the filing, a registrant
would benefit from a regulatory presumption of compliance."' 153 Under this
150 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 13.
151 Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 656 (2012).
15 2 See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.).
15 3 Doty, supra note 126, at 1234.
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proposal, "Reg. FCPA would set forth items required to be described,
represented or disclosed, with appropriate exhibits, constituting the registrant's
FCPA Compliance Program" and "[t]he filed FCPA Compliance Program
would be subject to Staff review and comment, as with the Annual Report on
Form 10-K."'1 54 A company would be required to establish an FCPA
Compliance Program and "to certify that it has ... discharged [its] duties under
the program."' 155
In the event of a violation, the registrant could claim a safe harbor if it could
show that it established and implemented an FCPA Compliance Program and
reasonably believed that it was compliant. 15 6 Doty argues that a Reg. FCPA
would address "the central issue of when a company's compliance system and
anti-bribery policy are sufficient, in either design or implementation, to
safeguard the corporate enterprise from vicarious responsibility for the actions
and omissions of employees"' 157 and would also "result in a more robust
interpretive process and greater guidance and predictability for U.S. companies
that seek to comply with the requirements of the statute." 158
Similar to the compliance-defense proposal, this proposal is unlikely to
provide the right incentives for a corporation to implement an effective
compliance program unless it was also required to disgorge its illicit profits.
Moreover, this proposal would seem to be an invitation to even more litigation,
with shareholders and investors alleging that the "Reg. FCPA" disclosure was
false or misleading because the company's compliance program had not been
effective to prevent bribery.
3. Parent/Subsidiary Liability
The Chamber also advocates limiting a parent company's civil liability for
the acts of a subsidiary unless the parent directed, authorized, or knew about the
improper payments in question. 159 Such an amendment would dovetail with the
Chamber's additional recommendation that Congress add a willfulness
requirement to establish corporate criminal liability, which the Chamber argues
is necessary to address the disparity in the legal treatment of corporations and
individuals under the Act. 160 The sum of the amendments is that corporations
would only be liable for FCPA violations where senior management knew about
and authorized a violation of the FCPA in circumvention of a rigorous
compliance program.
154 Id.




15 9 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 22 24.
1601d. at 20-22.
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This part of the Chamber's proposal is somewhat puzzling as neither of its
elements have anything to do with the FCPA. It is black-letter law that a parent
is only liable when it authorized or directed, or controlled a subsidiary's bad
conduct, i.e., where the parent was part of the wrongdoing. Although there are
certainly cases in which the government could have been clearer in delineating
this legal principle in its pleadings, there is nothing in the FCPA's anti-bribery
provisions that imposes any greater parent liability. Similarly, the FCPA's
standard for corporate liability is the same as applies in every other criminal
statute-a corporation is liable if an employee or agent, acting within the scope
of their duties and in part for the benefit of the corporation, violates the law. 16 1
The Chamber is, in effect, proposing to change the legal standard for corporate
liability solely for one statute, without explaining why it is necessary for the
FCPA, as opposed to all other offenses.
4. Limits (or Guidance) on Successor Liability
Another proposal put forward by the Chamber, and subscribed to by some
academics, is to limit a company's liability for the prior actions of a company it
has acquired. It claims that "[t]he uncertainty about how much due diligence is
sufficient... ha[s] in recent years had a significant chilling effect on mergers
and acquisitions" and that some "companies have ceased foreign operations
rather than face the uncertainties of FCPA enforcement."1 62 Accordingly, it
proposes that "a corporation, irrespective of whether or not it conducts
reasonable due diligence ... should not be held criminally liable for such
historical violations" and that guidance should be created "that spells out the
general due diligence steps that are warranted" in undertaking an M&A
transaction. 163 Daniel Grimm echoes the view that, at a minimum, further
guidance is needed on adequate diligence and that a safe harbor from successor
liability would alleviate the FCPA's strain on international transactions. Grimm
argues that:
The DOJ and the SEC could significantly reduce uncertainty in cross-border
M&A transactions by providing reasonable and firm FCPA due diligence and
post-closing compliance guidelines that can be relied upon by transacting
parties. A safe harbor from FCPA successor liability for business entities that
161 See Principles, supra note 58, at ch. 9-28.200(B) ("Under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, a corporation may be held criminally liable for the illegal acts of its directors,
officers, employees, and agents. To hold a corporation liable for these actions, the
government must establish that the corporate agent's actions (i) were within the scope of his
duties and (ii) were intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation.").
16 2 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 15.
163 Id. at 19-20.
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can show they have met the newfound guidelines would provide an effective
antidote to the current malaise. 164
First, similar to the Chamber's proposal on corporate liability, the
Chamber's proposal here is not tied to any particular text of the FCPA but is
instead a proposal to change corporate liability principles solely for the FCPA.
The FCPA never speaks to successor liability. Instead, the government,
applying traditional liability theories, has taken the position that a mere change
in ownership does not extinguish liability. As with the compliance defense, it
may be that this proposal would be less likely to create disincentives for
compliance if it included a provision to deprive those who benefited from the
wrongful conduct of their illicit proceeds. In the case of an M&A transaction,
that would be the previous owners or shareholders who presumably benefited
from the wrongful conduct through greater profits or a higher sales price. We
have observed in some cases that parties have established an escrow account to
cover fines resulting from ongoing investigations; it may be that this practice
could be adopted to establish an escrow account of certain duration for
companies with a high FCPA risk profile, thus protecting the acquirer for
undisclosed or undiscovered violations.
As to the second part of the proposal, we completely understand the desire
for guidance. Providing such guidance in a form that will provide a safe harbor,
however, will be difficult for the government, or for Congress, as there is no
such thing as a one size fits all due diligence program. Further, we are
concerned that this proposal may represent a case of "be careful for what you
wish" because we may not like the guidance we get. We can already see this in
the example of the Halliburton FCPA Opinion. 165 In that case, Halliburton
wished to have a safe harbor if it purchased a company through an auction that
provided only limited opportunity for due diligence. DOJ agreed, but only on
the condition that Halliburton agree to conduct extensive post-acquisition
compliance review including email reviews, forensic auditing, and periodic
reports to the government. 166 One can only imagine that Halliburton breathed a
sigh of relief when it did not win the auction and did not acquire the company!
5. Further Guidance
All critics of the current FCPA regime agree that further clarification is
needed with respect to the contours of an FCPA violation. They do not,
however, agree on who is best equipped to provide that guidance. The Chamber
164 Grimm, supra note 122, at 331.
165Opinion Procedure Release No. 08-02, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Foreign Corrupt
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calls for an amendment to the FCPA to clearly define "instrumentality."'1 67
Joseph Yockey has called for enhanced regulatory guidance to "clarify[] the
definition of 'foreign official,' the meaning of 'instrumentality' of a foreign
government, and the way regulators interpret the FCPA's corrupt intent and
business nexus requirements." '168
Others argue that "the primary initiative for change [should] come from the
enforcement authorities involved.116 9  Amy Westbrook, for example,
recommends that "[t]he DOJ and SEC should clarify, in general terms that
reflect the contemporary global business environment, what the FCPA
requires."' 170 She also proposes that "official clarification from the agencies that
indicates what is acceptable ('safe harbor') conduct ... would allow companies
to design business procedures that keep them within the law."'17 1
Other commentators take the position that judicial intervention in the
enforcement of diversion agreements "would help to clearly demarcate the line
between lawful and unlawful conduct, providing some certainty in FCPA
compliance and enforcement." 172 Citing Judge Jed S. Rakoffs widely
publicized denial of a proposed settlement in SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets
Inc.,173 Pete Georgis proposes that courts should engage in a review of all DPAs
and NPAs stemming from FCPA violations. 174
We have previously discussed the risks of asking for detailed guidance from
the government, whether it be the Executive or Legislative branch. Asking for it
from the Judicial branch may be no better. Indeed, as demonstrated by Judge
Rakoff's decision, courts may not necessarily intervene in ways that benefit a
corporate defendant. Moreover, although the government's theories may be put
to the test by establishing a judicial role in DPAs and NPAs, doing so also
reduces the certainty that accompanies a negotiated settlement and may lead to
greater disclosure and examination of the facts than a corporation would prefer.
C. Some of Our Own Proposals
Although we are not convinced that the proposals outlined above solve any
real problems, there are some areas in which FCPA enforcement and
compliance could be improved. We outline below a few modest suggestions.
167 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 27.
16 8 Yockey, supra note 128, at 833.
169 Ashcroft & Ratcliffe, supra note 126, at 35.
170 Westbrook, supra note 126, at 575.
17 11d. at 575 76.
172 Georgis, supra note 76, at 275-76.
173 SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
174 Georgis, supra note 76, at 279.
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1. Eliminate Overlapping Enforcement Jurisdiction
As described above, the FCPA originated in an SEC investigation into cash
slush funds maintained by issuers. Perhaps because the SEC initially brought
the problem to Congress, it gave both DOJ and the SEC jurisdiction over these
provisions.
In the first twenty years of the statute, the SEC brought almost no actions
under the anti-bribery provisions. More recently, for various reasons, it has
taken a greater interest in that part of the statute, and it is now a rare case
involving an issuer that does not have both a criminal action by DOJ and a
parallel civil action by the SEC. Indeed, in the 2010 reorganization of the SEC's
Division of Enforcement, the FCPA was identified as one of five areas of
concentration and there are now reportedly over thirty enforcement attorneys, as
well as in-house experts and accountants assigned to investigating FCPA
cases. 175
The SEC's enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions raises a fundamental
matter of fairness. Take two companies, one public and one private, and assume
that both violate the FCPA and realize the same illicit gain from the violation.
The private company will be subject only to DOJ's jurisdiction and will
therefore be exposed to a criminal fine of up to twice its gain. 176 The public
company, on the other hand, will be subject both to that criminal fine and to a
civil fine and disgorgement of the illicit proceeds, thus potentially paying a third
more in fines than the private company for the same conduct. 177
We respectfully submit that bribery, as opposed to books and records, is far
from central to the SEC's mission of protecting investors. Out of fairness, the
SEC should get out of the anti-bribery business.
2. Disgorgement
We don't mean to pick on the SEC, but its policy of demanding
disgorgement in books and records cases should also be carefully examined. As
Paul R. Berger, Steven S. Michaels, and Amanda M. Ulrich have explained,
"[t]o obtain disgorgement, the government must prove a causal connection
between the wrongdoing and the profits representing the unjust enrichment."' 178
17 5 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit
Chiefs and Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-5.htm; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE
OF THE UNITED STATES: QUESTIONS CONCERNING PHASE 3, OECD WORKING GROUP ON
BRIBERY 9, 42 (May 3, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
docs/response3.pdf.
176 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006).177 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006).
178 Paul R. Berger et al., Do FCPA Remedies Follow FCPA Wrongs? "Disgorgement"
in Internal Controls and Books and Records Cases, FCPA UPDATE (Debevoise & Plimpton
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In a bribery case, there is a clear link between the bribes paid and the illicit
proceeds realized. But, as Berger and his colleagues have argued, where only
books and records and internal controls violations are alleged, there is a
"disconnect between the remedy and the charged 'wrong"' because no causal
connection exists between the failure to accurately record a payment and any
illegal profits arising from that payment. 179 We agree with these authors that, at
a minimum, the courts (or Congress) should take a hard look at whether the
SEC's practice of seeking disgorgement in books and records cases crosses the
line from equitable remedy into punishment for the charged violations.
3. Require Clear Pleadings
To some degree, the ambiguity cited by the critics is not the fault of the
statute but of sloppy or deliberately vague pleading by the authorities. As an
example, in a number of recent cases, the government has described different
kinds of payments, some of which are clearly "obtain or retain business" bribes
while others are just as clearly facilitation payments that may have not been
booked properly. However, rather than identifying which is which, the
government has simply incorporated all of the alleged payments into both the
bribery and books and records counts.180 Similarly, in some other recent cases,
even the link to "obtain or retaining business" is obscure, such as where the
payment was to allow goods into a country; it might be that there is a theory
that such importing was essential to the defendant's ability to obtain or retain
business, but the government did not go to the trouble of alleging the necessary
facts. 181
In short, although the statute is not complicated, it does require the
existence of certain elements. The government, it seems to us, is obligated to
outline the factual and legal basis for its charges.
4. Develop Transparent Protocolfor Multiple Jurisdictions
Prior to the OECD Convention and other international agreements, most
transnational bribery payments violated the laws of only two countries-the
United States and the country whose official was bribed. Today, a single
payment may violate the laws of numerous countries. For example, a French




180 Compare Information at 5-8, United States v. Panalpina, Inc., No. 10-765 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 4, 2010) (explaining that many of the allegedly improper payments related to expedited
processing of customs procedures), with 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I(b) (2006) (FCPA exception for
payments to expedite routine government actions).
181 See, e.g, United States v. Panalpina, Inc., No. 10-765 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010).
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company meets with a Libyan official in Italy and then pays a bribe out of its
Swiss bank account. That alone violates four countries' laws. If the payment
was made in U.S. dollars or the company is a U.S. issuer, that makes five
countries, and so on.
The OECD Convention contemplates that the parties will coordinate
investigations and prosecutions under these circumstances. 182 To some degree,
we have seen more coordination in the former, but it remains unclear who takes
the lead and what happens when differing jurisdictions take a different view of
the applicable law or evidence. We suggest that there be a clear protocol that
will establish under which circumstances a particular country will lead the
investigation. Further, under what circumstances will the U.S. authorities defer
to a foreign enforcement authority's facially valid decision, i.e., not a decision
based on apparent political or economic reasons, but based on a conclusion that
there are not sufficient facts to establish a violation?
VII. CONCLUSION
Compliance with the law can sometime be difficult, particularly in
situations where a corporation is operating outside its comfort zone, in countries
with less transparency and greater opportunities for corruption. The FCPA,
however, demands that companies take these costs into account before doing
business in those places in the first place. Not doing so, of course, invites the
risk of an even more expensive and more damaging enforcement action. Well-
run companies have responded by adopting risk-based compliance programs
that are based on compliance models developed through years of private sector
experience and government guidance. The true measure of the effectiveness of
the FCPA is the adoption and internal enforcement of these programs.
The recent surge in enforcement has, of course, sparked a backlash. More
enforcement offers more opportunities for criticism and more opportunities for
suggesting that enforcement of the law against businesses is unfair or
unpredictable. These claims are, for the most part, unsupported by facts or law
and most of the proposals are unlikely to improve the effectiveness of the
statute. Indeed, in some cases, the reforms would open loopholes that are likely
to make enforcement of the statute impossible. Although there are some issues
relating to the government's application of the statute in particular cases, these
can be addressed without destructive surgery on the statute itself.
182 OECD Convention, supra note 67, at art. 4, para. 3.
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